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Ihe-Egreessn-Eer!leos!!,
- whereas important arms controL negotiatìons are nearing a decision,
- aLarmed at the growing arms buiLd-up throughout the world,
- whereas thìs poses a partìcuLarty serious threat to Europe,
- convìnced that there is no aLternative to poLiticat détente, disarmament
and a PeacefuL baLance,
- convinced that it is incumbent upon the European Partiament as on aLL
partìaments to support every effort in the interests of peace,
1. l,leLcomes the Nuctear Freeze Resotution passed by the us House of
Representatives on 4 May 1983 and endorses its proposaLs;
?. Instructs its President to forvard this resotution to the foreign ministers
meeting in poLiticat cooperation and the Congress of the United States'
Anner
Text of the NucLear Freeze Resolution
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1983 )
ca).Iing for a mutual and verifiable freeze on anl reductions in
nuclear ,r.apor,=. wtet"a= the greatest challenge f acing the
earth is to prevent the occurrànce of nuclear war by accident
or design;
whereas the united states and the soviet union have signed thejoint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations'
known as the l.lcc).oy-iorin agreement, enumerating general principles
for future negotiaLions for international Peace and security;
Whereas the increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear
delivery systems by both the united states and the soviet union
have not strengthe-nea internationaL Peace and security' but in
facÈ enhance tÉe prosPect for nutual destruction;
whereas adequate verification of compliance has always been an
in<iispensanre firt of any international arms control agreementt
and
Whereas a mutual and verifiable freeze and reductions in nuclear
weaPonsandnucleardeliverysystemswouldgreatlyreducethe
risk of nucrear war: now, tÉerèfore, be it resorved by the senate
and House of À.pt.=.r,tatives of the Uniced States of America in
Congress assembled, that, consistent with Èhe maintenance of
essenÈiaI equivalence in overall nuclear capabilities at present and
in the future, the strategic Arms ReducÈion Talks (START) between
the unit,ed states and the soviet union should have the foll0wing
objectives:
I.Pursuingtheobjectiveofnegotiatinganimmediatqmutual
and vèrif iable f ree-ze. Then pursuing the objective of
negotiating immediate, mutua]. and verifiable reductions in
nuc lear vJeapons .
2. Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable fteeze
on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads'
missiles and other delivery systems which would threaten the
viability of sea-based nucleai deterrent forces and to include
aII air defense systems designed to stoP nuclear bombers' sub-
marines are not delivery systems as used herein
J " Consistent with pursuing the objective of negotiating aniinmediate, mutual and verif iable f reeze' giving special
atEention to destabirising weapons, especialLy those which give
either nation capabif iti."i wtriéh confer uPon it even theÀypotrretical advantages of a f irst strike'
4. Providj.ng for cooperative measures of verification' includingprc,visions ior o.r-site inspection, as apProPriate, to complement
national technical means of verification and to ensure compliance'
2.
5. Proceeding fro. this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing
substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions through
numerical ceilings, annual Percentages or any other equally
effective and verifiable means of strengthèning strategic
stability, with such reductions to be achieved within a
reasonable, sPecified Period of time as determined by the
negotiations.
5. Preserving Present'Iimitations and conÈrols on nuclear
weapons and nuclear delivery systems.
7. lncorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-
range n,-r"1e"r systems into the START negoÈiations. Discussing
the impact of developing comPrehensive defensive Systems con-
sistent with all provisions of the treaty on the limitation of
anti-ballistic missile systems.
8. Not.hing in this resolution shal} be tonstrued by United
Srates n"gòtiations to mandate any agreement that would jeopardise
our abilitY to Preserve freedom.
In those negotiatiolrs, the United States sha}I make every effort
to reach a common position with our North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation allies on any element of an agreement which would
be inconsistent with existing United States commitments to
those aIIies.
Sec. 2 In the absence of a bilateral agreement embodying
the ob jectives set, f orth ì-n this joinÈ resolution. Nothing in
this résolution is interÈd to prevent the United States from
carrying out iÈs responsibilities unqer the December L979
ItortÉ eilantic Treaty Organisation decision regarding intermediate
range nuclear forces.
sec. 3 (a) Consistent with purusing the overriding objective of
negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, nothing
in tris r.=olotion shalI be construed to prevent the_united
States from taki,ng advantage of concurrent and comPlementAry
arms control ProPosals.
(b) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to supercede
the treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution'
Sec. 4 This resolution does not endoree any type of unilateral
disarmament on the parÈ of the United States.
Sec. 5 Consistent, with purusing the overriding objective of
negotiating an immediat,e, mutual and verifiable freeze, nothing
in this resolution should be construed to prevent measures
necessary for the maintenance of and credibility of the United
States nuclear deterrent-
Sec. 6 UntiI such timeasthe final instrument embodying the
objectives set forth in section I has been fully ratified by both the
Soviet Union and the United States, nothing in this joint resolution shall
be construed to prevent whatever nodernisation and èplcytEnt of United
States rreapons rnay be reqrrired to maintain the credibility of the United
States nuclear &ÈerrenÈ.
3.
sec. 7 The CongÈess ProPoses that the House committee on
F.oreign Af fairs and t,he senaEe committee on Foreign Relations
study measures relaÈing to reductions pursuant to the firsÈ
section. And relating to concurrent and complementary arms
control proposals pursuant to section 2, especially those aimed
at progrà"=ir" reductions in the number of destabilising weapons
tnròugn a mutual "build-down" or other verifiable Processes'
Sec. 8 Any freeze agreement negotiaÈed pursuant to this
resolution should not parent thè United States from taking
such measures with respect to our strategic systems as are
necessary to protect tire Iives of the United States personnel
operating those systems-
sec. 9 For purposes of this resolution, a nuclear delivery vehicle
is a device wnoèe primary or exclusive mission requires it to
carry a nuclear *.àpon into Èerritory of or occuPied by hostile
forces
sec. IO A freeze agreement in accordance with this resolution
wiII not preclude tÀe one-for-one replacement of nuclear weaPons
and nuclear delivery vehicles in order to preserve the credibility
of the United States nuclear deterrence' Provided the neh' weaPon
or delivery vehicle is the same type as the old'
sec. II Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed'
i. to prevent, during any negot,iations Pursuant to this resolution,
or
ii. to require that, in any negot.iations pursuant to this
resolut.ion, the united states agree to a proi,ision which
would prevent, such modernisation and deployment of
united states new or improved dual capable delivery systems
as the united states *ay determine is required to maintain
the capabitity of the united states defense Posture.
Sec. LZ ConsistenÈ with public law 88-186. As amended, no action
shall be taken under this act that will obligate the united states
to disarm or to reduce or to limit the armed forces or armaments
of the United States, excePt Pursuant to Èhe treaty making power of
the President under the Constitution or unless authorised by
further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States'
§ec. 13 Consistent with the provisions of public law 92-448 ' as
amended, negotiations undertaken pursuant to this act shalI
frovide for the mainÈenance of a vigorous research, develoPment
and saftey-re).ated improvements Program to assure that the united
States would noE be limiÈed to levels of nuclear deterrent forces
inferior to Èhe force levels of the soviet union' Further' such
negotiations should recognise the difficulty of maintaining
essential equivalence 
"ttà a stable balance in nuclear 
deterrent
capabilities in a period of rapidly developing technology' and
that any future arms control agreements should ,Promote and stable
internaÈionaI balance and enhance t.he survivability of United §tates
nuclear deterrent forces-
4.
sec. 14 In all hegotiations pursuant to this resolution' the
United States shall make every effort to ensure that any agreement-
reached shalI provide for fuIl compliance by aII parties with
[i.:"*i=ting international treaties, obligations and commitments'
Sec. I5
f rozen .
Any item both sides do not agree to freeze would not be
sec. 16 The PresidenÈ shalL take aÌL necessary steps to ensure
thatanyagreementemboydingtheobjectivessetforthinthis
:"i"t .àsoiution can be adeiuately verified, including pursuing
the objective of providing in. 
"ooperative measures 
of verification
(including provi=ion" for onsite inspection as appropriat'e) to
complement national technical means of verification and to
ensure comPliance.
Sec. I7 Nothing in this joint resolut
to prevent safety-related improvements
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